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What is the impact of the recent allegations of coup plots in Turkey for democratization? At first 
glance, the Ergenekon case seems to be furthering democratization by cleansing the military of 
coup plotters, strengthening the hands of the civilians in reforming civil-military relations and 
reshaping the public’s attitudes toward the military. However, this paper analyzes Turkish public 
opinion on the trials, based on an original nationwide opinion survey designed to understand 
attitudes towards the military. Contrary to the superficial reading of the consequences of the 
coup trials, the survey findings demonstrate that Turkish politics is highly polarized on the court 
case. This type of polarization is indicative of an unconsolidated democracy where actors 
mutually suspect each other’s intentions. Thus, instead of contributing to democratic 
consolidation, the Ergenekon case cuts deeply into the already existing divides in society and, as 
a result, jeopardizes further democratization.  
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Civil-military relations in Turkey took an exceptional turn in 2007 with the start of an 
investigation, known to the public as Ergenekon, that implicated military officers in coup plots. 
The inquisition can be traced back to March 2007, when the alleged diaries of a former 
commander of the navy published by a weekly magazine exposed plans of a military intervention 
against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in 
2003–2004. In the subsequent years, other plots were revealed.Among them the Sledgehammer 
investigation started as a separate inquisition in January 2010, and 325 suspects, including the 
former first army commander and former commanders of the air force and navy, were found 
guilty and received prison sentences in September 2012. In June 2014, the Constitutional Court 
overturned this decision and all of the accused were released from prison. Although arguably the 
Sledgehammer plot and other court cases also had a significant impact on public views regarding 
the Turkish armed forces, this article focuses only on the consequences of the Ergenekon case 
between 2007 and 2012. 
With the start of the official Ergenekon investigation in June 2007, hundreds of people, 
including journalists, academics, and retired and active-duty military officers of various ranks, 
were accused of coup plans and put on trial. In August 2013, the court reached a verdict and 
among the 275 individuals who had been formally charged, 31 were sentenced for attempting to 
stage a coup, 11 were found guilty of leading the Ergenekon terrorist organization, and 194 were 
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condemned to imprisonment for being members of the same organization or aiding it.1  The 
accused individuals were said to have established Ergenekon with the purpose of generating 
chaos in society that would build up opposition to the ruling AKP. The allegations included 
attacks against minority groups, bombing mosques, assassinating public figures, blowing up a 
newspaper, and setting up Web sites in order to trigger disorder and discontent in Turkish society 
that would provide the justification for the military to stage a coup and intervene against the 
government. In March 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the rights of a number of 
Ergenekon suspects were violated and released all suspects from prison. Indeed, the Ergenekon 
trial is not yet over, as an appeals procedure is still in progress. There is a good chance that 
eventually all suspects will be acquitted. Nevertheless, the investigation and the trials were 
unprecedented in Turkish history because, for the first time, high-ranking officers, including a 
former chief of the General Staff and commanders of the armed forces, were sentenced to life 
imprisonment for allegedly plotting coups to topple an elected civilian government. 
What was the effect of this unparalleled court case on Turkish democratic consolidation 
between 2007 and 2012? At first glance, it seems that the Ergenekon case furthered the ongoing 
democratization process by cleansing the military of coup plotters, strengthening the hands of the 
civilians in reforming civil-military relations, and reshaping the public’s attitudes toward the 
military. In a country that has witnessed two military coups d’état (1960, 1980) and two military 
interventions that forced the governments of the day out of power (1971, 1997), these 
developments are undeniably significant. 
Yet this article argues that despite these favorable changes in politics, the Ergenekon case 
did not have a positive effect on Turkish democratic consolidation. In order to assess the impact 
of the coup investigation on Turkish politics, the article uses the data set of the Survey on the 
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Armed Forces and Society in Turkey (SAFST), conducted in October 2011 by face-to-face 
interviews with 2,775 people.2 The results of the survey indicate that Ergenekon contributed to 
polarization among political groups. Centrifugal tendencies in politics are not conducive to 
consolidation, especially when they are over issues such as coup plots that have direct 
implications for the survival of the regime. 
The first section of the article briefly analyzes the seemingly positive consequences of the 
Ergenekon trials for Turkish democracy. The second part looks into the impact of polarization on 
democratic consolidation theoretically and discusses the recent increase in the divergence of 
views in Turkish politics as a result of the Ergenekon case. The third part of the article tests the 
hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion and observations of Turkish politics using the 
SAFST data. The conclusions from the empirical analysis indicate that, overall, the Ergenekon 
investigation did not aid the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. 
 
THE SEEMING CONTRIBUTIONS OF ERGENEKON TO TURKISH DEMOCRACY 
Students of Turkish politics analyzing the court cases in Turkey would conclude that the 
Ergenekon case had important consequences for democratization. Once the definitions of 
democracy and regime consolidation are considered, the significance of the coup accusations and 
trials for democratization are revealed.3  
In order to consider a country fully democratic, the armed forces and other unelected 
institutions should not have powers and prerogatives that would challenge or restrict the 
decision-making capabilities of elected officials, such as the government and parliament.4 If the 
military has tutelary powers and policy domains in which it makes decisions on its own, it is not 
possible to refer to that country as a liberal democracy. Although related to the procedures of 
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liberal democracy, the concept of consolidation is different and goes beyond the institutional and 
legal prerequisites. For democratic consolidation, all significant actors and, in countries where 
the military historically had political powers and prerogatives, the armed forces should 
attitudinally and behaviorally endorse democracy. If a group of actors with potentially significant 
power to disturb the political system does not consider democracy the best regime suitable for 
the country, then democracy is not consolidated.5 
Given these definitions of liberal democracy and democratic consolidation, arguably, the 
coup trials contributed to Turkish democratization. First, to the extent that the investigation  led 
to the arrests and trials of coup plotters in the armed forces, it is possible to claim that those 
officers, who had a mind-set that could disrupt the normal functioning of the regime, were 
cleansed from the military. Antidemocratic attitudes and beliefs among the personnel of the 
armed forces could be threatening to democracy, especially if those officers have the necessary 
resources to stage a coup d’état. Therefore, by definition, the trials of putschists were a positive 
development. 
Second, it could be asserted that the Ergenekon trials strengthened the hands of the 
politicians vis-à-vis the General Staff and gave impetus to reforms in civil-military relations. The 
military has been a political actor since the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, with 
increasing importance after the 1960 coup. Until the last decade, the significance of the military 
in political decision making had continued, and aside from direct and indirect military 
interventions, the armed forces exercised tutelary powers through several institutional 
mechanisms, including the National Security Council.6 After 1999, when the prospect of 
European Union (EU) membership was popular both among the public7 and within the ranks of 
the military,8 the politicians started to reform civil-military relations as part of the set of legal 
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amendments that were required by EU conditionality.9 However, the reform process had come to 
a standstill by 2006, when the prospects for EU membership dwindled, in part because of the 
decision of the EU to freeze the negotiation process with Turkey. 
The drive to civilianize the regime was stimulated after 2007 with the start of the 
Ergenekon trials. The likelihood of the General Staff reacting to the AKP government and 
resisting or controlling the reform process became almost impossible, as such interventions were 
now seen as exercising undemocratic powers. The acquiescence of the General Staff to the 
arrests of the suspected officers changed the balance of power in favor of the civilians and gave 
assurance to the politicians that a military intervention to protect the political privileges of the 
armed forces was impossible. With the Ergenekon case, the military was purged of putschist 
officers, and, at the same time, it became clear that any attempt at an intervention would warrant 
a strong judicial reaction and probable penalties for those who were suspected of being involved 
with coup plans. Thus, after 2007, in a political environment that gave more security to the 
civilians, the initiative to carry out amendments in civil-military relations was renewed. 
Among some of the significant reforms, the following can be cited: the abolishment of 
the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order, which had justified the military in 
carrying out operations and gathering intelligence independent of the civilians; the involvement 
of the civilians in the promotion of senior-ranking officers; judicial review of the decisions of the 
High Military Council involving purges from the armed forces; the restriction of the legal 
authority of military courts; and the removal of the military troops stationed outside of the 
parliament.10  
 A third possible contribution of the investigation to democratization was the changing 
stance of the public toward the military and, especially, a drop in the level of confidence in the 
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armed forces. Even though the results from the public opinion surveys conducted in the 1990s 
and early 2000s indicate high confidence in the military among all social classes and 
demographic groups,11 Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that after 2007, there was a 
significant decrease.12 Similar to other surveys conducted in the early 2000s, the Eurobarometer 
surveys show that in these years, the Turkish public was generally supportive of the armed 
forces. The Eurobarometer surveys posed the following question to respondents: “I would like to 
ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” 13 The army 
was one of the institutions that the surveys asked about, and in the early 2000s, on average, 88 
percent of the Turkish respondents said that they tend to trust the army, while 10 percent 
declared that they tend not to trust it. These results were relatively higher than the trust that 
respondents accorded to other institutions, such as the government, parliament, the legal system, 
and political parties. Moreover, compared with the attitudes in EU member states, the Turkish 
public trusted the armed forces more than the European publics trusted their militaries.14 
Although confidence in the military was high in the early 2000s,15 the results of the 
surveys started to change after 2007. In 2008, 83 percent of the respondents declared that they 
tend to trust the military, while the percentage of the people who declared that they do not have 
confidence in the military increased approximately five percentage points. The number of people 
in Turkey who asserted that they tend not to trust the military increased further to 20 percent in 
2009 and to 28 percent in 2010. Conversely, the trust people accorded to the military decreased 
to 77 percent in 2009 and to 69 percent in 2010. 16 Once the respondents who gave a “don’t 
know” answer are omitted from the calculations, it can be seen that that by 2010, the Turkish 
public trusted its army even less than the EU societies (see Figure 1). 
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Moreover, when the data from different regions of Turkey are compared, it becomes clear 
that the drop in the levels of trust for the military was uniform across the country. Even though 
there were various ups and downs in trends, by 2010, all of the regional averages had fallen 
below the strong trust accorded to the army in the first half of the 2000s. Most regions were 
above the Turkish average because respondents from southeastern Anatolia, where the majority 
the population is from Kurdish ethnic origin, consistently declared lower levels of trust in the 
military compared with the respondents from other regions. Given that the Turkish military was 
in combat with Kurdish forces in this region, this finding is expected. Another interesting 
observation when compared with the general trend is the results in Istanbul. The biggest city in 
Turkey, with a population of more than 10 million inhabitants from various occupational, ethnic, 
and religious backgrounds and ideological convictions, witnessed the most significant drop in 
trust levels. In 2007, 92 percent of the Istanbul respondents that they trusted the military. 
However, in 2008, the first dramatic fall took place, with 65 percent saying that they tend to trust 
the military.In 2010, only 54 percent declared a positive view. Despite this important point, 
Istanbul and southeastern Anatolia share the common inclination of a drop in trust levels 
observed in all regions of Turkey. 
Although it is not possible to make a definitive claim as to which factors led to the 
change in the trust levels accorded to the military across regions and generally in Turkey, the 
timing of the drop in the Eurobarometer surveys indicates that the Ergenekon investigation might 
have been the crucial event.17 Changes in public opinion started to take place in the Turkish 
average in 2008, only a year after the start of the Ergenekon investigation in 2007. The critical 
breaking point seems to have occurred following the coup allegations, even though levels of trust 
started to diminish even further in the subsequent years. 
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The question of public confidence in the armed forces is significant for Turkish 
democratization for two reasons. First, public attitudes toward the military have the potential to 
influence the decisions of the politicians and affect their willingness to curtail the tutelary powers 
of the military. Until the reform process that started in 1999, civilians hesitated to restrain the 
tutelary powers of the military, mainly because they feared that such an action would trigger a 
coup against them, but also because it was believed that such reforms would be unpopular.18 
Similarly, once the reform process started (mainly as a result of EU conditionality), many 
analysts of Turkish politics feared that such amendments in civil-military relations would remain 
only on paper, and military tutelage would continue.19 Such skepticism was a result of the belief 
that the military derived its legitimacy not only from the constitution and the legal framework 
that allowed it to exercise political powers but also from the acceptance of such a role among the 
public.20 The popularity of the military was seen as an impediment, standing in the way of 
substantively reforming civil-military relations. Thus, in addition to strengthening the hands of 
the civilians by thwarting coup plotters (as outlined earlier), arguably, the Ergenekon 
investigation also contributed to the civilianization of the regime by turning public opinion in 
favor of the politicians and the reforms. 
The second reason why the decreasing level of trust in the military is important for 
democratization is that confidence in the armed forces is a symptom of unconsolidated 
democracy in Turkey. Quantitative research has suggested that confidence in the military and 
support for democracy are positively related in the Turkish case. Two studies that have analyzed 
World Values Survey results in different years have demonstrated that among those who lend 
support to democracy, confidence in institutions of order, including the military, is higher.21 The 
assertion that democratic individuals in Turkey trust the military, which has staged coups and 
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intervened against it, makes sense once it is considered that the armed forces justified its 
intrusions as attempts to protect democracy and guard it against internal threats.22 Based on their 
findings in a survey conducted in 2006, Çarkoğlu and Toprak conclude that “although the 
majority of the public does not agree with the idea that only a military regime can solve Turkey’s 
problems, it is clear that the public supports a unique role for the military in the context of 
Turkish politics.”23 This finding is paradoxical, especially when the conditions under which 
democratic consolidation thrives are considered. As explained earlier, in consolidated 
democracies, the tutelage of the military should be undesirable for all significant groups in a 
society. If the link between support for democratic institutions and confidence in the military can 
only be explained by the tutelary functions of the armed forces, then it would be clear that trust 
in the military is a sign of an unconsolidated democracy. Thus, any decrease in public confidence 
in the armed forces can be perceived as a positive development in terms of democratization. 
In conclusion, at first glance, it seems that the Ergenekon investigation had favorable 
consequences for Turkish democratization. While the civilianization of the regime gained new 
momentum, the support of the armed forces personnel for democratic rules of the game was 
attitudinally and behaviorally guaranteed. Moreover, Turkish public opinion regarding the 
military seemed to change, and, according to Eurobarometer data, confidence in the armed forces 
decreased to the level of European democracies (69 percent), with possible encouraging effects 
on democracy. But this is only one side of the coin. A closer examination of public opinion on 
Ergenekon indeed shows that the trials contributed to polarization in society, which was not 




DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND POLARIZATION IN TURKEY 
Few scholars of democratic consolidation would disagree with the argument that polarization in 
politics is unfavorable to democratic consolidation.24 Widespread support for democracy means 
that there should be consensus among political groups, and especially the elites, on the basic 
rules of the regime.25 Polarization threatens this basic characteristic of a consolidated democracy. 
It can lead to severe conflicts and radicalization among groups at both the elite and the mass 
levels. Intense political disagreements, in turn, may result in questioning of the rules of the 
regime and eschewing of democratic norms and attitudes.26 More specifically, as Sani and 
Segatti argue for the Italian case, polarization might jeopardize two basic values of democracy: 
“(1) the notion that competition is the very essence of democracy, and (2) recognition that the 
winner of this competition is rightfully entitled to rule.”27 The existence of actors who challenge 
these fundamental elements of democracy makes the regime an unconsolidated one by definition. 
Apart from damaging democratic consolidation through attitudinal change, polarization 
also alters the behaviors of the actors. As a result of polarization, actors might see a risk to their 
interests, not commit to the regime, and sustain antidemocratic exit options.28 In other words, 
when conflict is intense, actors “look for other, frequently illegal and antidemocratic ways to 
shore up their positions, engaging in democratic processes only as long as such activities are 
useful in advancing their interests.”29 Centrifugal tendencies breed more conflict, as rival groups 
mutually suspect each other’s intentions and question their commitment to democracy. Thus, as 
the government (or one group) attempts to suppress the opposition (or the rival group), the end 
result is a vicious circle of continuing polarization.30 In fact, such spirals of polarization could 
even contribute to the collapse of a democratic regime altogether.31 
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Turkish democracy broke down several times as a result of intense conflicts among 
political groups after the transition to multiparty politics in 1946. The CHP ruled as a single 
party for 23 years, until 1950, when the Democratic Party (DP) won the elections, peacefully 
changing the regime from an authoritarian to a democratic one. Although authoritarianism never 
returned to Turkey again, polarization in politics led to violence and military coups. In 1960 and 
1980, the Turkish military staged overt coups, and in 1971 and 1997, it forced governments out 
of power. While in 1960, polarization between the ruling DP and the main opposition CHP tore 
down democracy, in 1971 and 1980, conflict among leftist and rightist groups led to the collapse 
of the regime. Indeed, polarization has been an important characteristic of Turkish politics, in 
part explaining the failure of democracy to consolidate.32 
In terms of the four cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan in their model for 
European democracies,33 Turkey historically never experienced an intense conflict between the 
urban and rural elites (or the landed nobility and the burghers), in part because of the small 
landholding pattern in Anatolia. The second cleavage in the Lipset and Rokkan model, namely, 
that between worker and employer interests, became pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s, but 
after the 1980s, this cleavage lost its dominance. From the 1990s until 2012, divergence along 
two other lines, namely, secularism versus religious conservatism and Turkish versus Kurdish 
nationalism, dominated politics.34 In the Lipset and Rokkan model, the former cleavage could be 
defined as the “conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing Nation-State and 
the historically established corporate privileges of the Church.”35 Even though there is no church 
in Islam, this cleavage still applied to Turkey once it is considered that the main issue in this 
cleavage d been “one of morals, of the control of community norms . . . [and most importantly] 
on the control of education.”36 These issues d been the primary dividing line between religious 
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and secular groups in Turkey since the foundation of the nation-state. The state during the single-
party era introduced secular principles in political and social life, which led to conflictual 
relations between the state elites and religious groups, with various degrees of intensity in the 
upcoming years. In the multiparty period, political parties emerged aiming to explicitly represent 
religious interests. 
Since the founding of the nation-state, the military had been a central player in this 
cleavage, claiming to protect the secular foundations of the republic and taking action against 
pro-Islamist parties.37 The armed forces justified their military interventions in part by the favors 
that political parties gave to Islamic currents. In 1997, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi, RP) and its coalitional partner, the True Path Party, were forced out of the government by 
the pressure of the military. 38 In the subsequent years, the RP and its heir, the Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Partisi, FP), were closed down by the Constitutional Court on charges of violating the 
constitution and engaging in activities against secularism. 
After the closure of the FP, the movement split into two factions.39 The more moderate 
group of politicians founded the AKP in August 2001, which received the largest vote share in 
the 2002 elections. The party renewed its mandate to rule in the 2007 and 2011 elections. 
Although the leaders of the party had at times claimed that the AKP did not carry out politics 
based on religion, given that it was descended from organizations that were closed down because 
of their activities against secularism, there was considerable suspicion that the AKP had an 
ulterior motive, which was to turn Turkey into an Islamic republic.40 Since the 2002 elections, 
the secularists have been represented in parliament by the main opposition CHP. The CHP is the 
party that founded the republic in 1923, ruled singlehandedly for more than 20 years, and since 
then, despite changes in its ideology, has defended secularist principles. Studies examining the 
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bases of support for the AKP and CHP in the early 2000s show that the voters of the two parties 
were distinguished from each other by their stance on the pro-Islamist versus secularist 
cleavage.41 Even though the voter bases of the AKP and the CHP could not be reduced only to 
this issue,42 both in terms of their ideologies and bases of support, the two parties represented 
two ends of the political spectrum, with the CHP being the main party of the secularist camp and 
the AKP being the leading party of the pro-Islamist camp. 
The second cleavage that had dominated politics since the 1980 coup is based on 
ethnicity, which polarizes Turkish and Kurdish nationalists. This is the cleavage that Lipset and 
Rokkan refer to as the “conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing 
resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the 
provinces and the peripheries.”43 This divergence in politics matches the territorial dimension of 
the national cleavage structure and a center versus periphery conflict. In the Turkish context, 
similar to the pro-Islamist versus secularist cleavage, this issue went back several decades in 
Turkish politics, its antecedents lying in the creation of the Turkish nation-state in the 1920s. The 
visibility of Kurdish separatism increased substantially in the 1980s with the rise of the activities 
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK).44 Again, similar to the 
secularist versus pro-Islamist cleavage, the military had been a dominant player in this issue area 
as well. The combat against Kurdish separatism in the southeastern regions had been led 
primarily by the Turkish armed forces since the 1980s. 
In the political arena, the polarization between Kurdish and Turkish nationalists was 
visible along party lines. Although Kurdish voters supported various parties, including the AKP, 
the voters of the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) were mostly of 
Kurdish origin. Founded in 2008 and dissolved in 2014, the BDP was the heir to several parties 
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that were closed down by the Constitutional Court because of their links with the PKK and their 
activities against the indivisibility of the Turkish state. Although the primary party of Turkish 
nationalism was traditionally the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,  MHP),45 
there is evidence to suggest that nationalists also voted for other parties, including the AKP. 
Once the party system between 2002 and 2012 is analyzed, it is clear that Turkish politics 
was polarized along pro-Islamist versus secularist and the Turkish versus Kurdish nationalist 
cleavages. Public opinion surveys also corroborated the existence of polarization along these 
lines, and there was a social cleavage that juxtaposed “us” (meaning Turkish, Muslim, and Sunni 
jointly) against “others” (meaning Kurdish, non-Sunni—that is, mostly Alevi and non-Muslim 
separately).46 The two dominant cleavages could be perceived as crosscutting ones, dividing 
Turkish politics into four quadrants, namely, Turkish pro-Islamist, Turkish secularist, Kurdish 
pro-Islamist, and Kurdish secularist. The majority of the population seemed to be located in the 
Turkish pro-Islamist quadrant, as both religiosity and nationalism were important components of 
Turkish conservatism.47 However, considerable segments of the public could also be placed in 
the secularist and Kurdish ends of the two separate cleavage lines. The AKP represented those 
who identified themselves in the Turkish pro-Islamist quadrant, but it also gathered votes from 
pro-Islamists of Kurdish origin. The MHP got votes from Turkish nationalists of both religious 
and secular convictions, while the CHP represented primarily Turkish secularists. The BDP 
stood for the Kurdish nationalists and, as such, primarily drew its support base from Kurdish 
secularists. Although public opinion was divided along these lines, the political leadership of the 
parties was located at the more extreme ends of the two cleavages, influencing the public and 
leading to further polarization. 
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POLARIZATION AMONG THE PUBLIC DUE TO THE ERGENEKON CASE 
Once the centrifugal characteristics of Turkish politics are considered, it is no surprise that the 
Ergenekon investigationwas interpreted differently by the AKP and the opposition. Among the 
national press, intellectuals, and civil society groups, there was considerable controversy over the 
inquisition and the court case.48 
More specifically, there were three interrelated issues of tension between the supporters 
of the trials and those who raised concerns.49 The first disagreement was over the existence of 
the Ergenekon terrorist organization and whether the accused individuals were in fact guilty. 
Although the indictments consisted of thousands of pages, opposition groups believed that they 
had not proved the existence of a clandestine organization beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, 
the individuals who had been charged with being members of Ergenekon were not only military 
officers but also others coming from diverse backgrounds, such as journalism, academia, civil 
society, and business. The seemingly unconnected past experiences of the individuals led to 
doubts over whether they could have been operating as part of the same organization.50 
The second argument against Ergenekon was related to the legal procedures that were 
being followed by the prosecutors and the police.51 Besides the peculiarities of the Ergenekon 
case itself, this controversy was also attributable to the endemic problems of the Turkish 
judiciary. Despite attempts to reform the judiciary in the last decade, it is still a cumbersome 
institution, which is viewed by international as well as Turkish experts as slow in making 
decisions and dependent on the executive and the ruling party of the day; in addition, judges and 
prosecutors pay disproportionate attention to the security of the state rather than individual rights 
and freedoms.52 The Ergenekon case was not an exception to these inherent problems. As in 
most judicial cases in Turkey, the process moved slowly, and the trials were concluded after 
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almost five years. According to a number of critiques, the proof that was provided to accuse 
these individuals was fictitious, and the long duration of the trials kept innocent people in prison 
based on fabricated evidence. The problems were compounded because some of the suspects 
were imprisoned at the beginning of the investigation without being formally charged for 
months, and a few individuals with medical problems were detained, which resulted in the 
worsening of their health conditions. 
Finally, there was considerable debate among the Turkish public as to whether the AKP 
government was using the Ergenekon case to its advantage to round up opponents to its rule. 
Although the AKP was elected to power for three consecutive terms since 2002, the opposition 
believed that the party had become increasingly authoritarian and gradually tightened its grip on 
critics. The structural flaws of the judiciary, which led it to depend on the executive, were 
compounded in the Ergenekon case by the fact that the accused individuals were from various 
backgrounds and were known to have opposed the AKP. There was a belief in secular circles 
that the AKP had a religious and antidemocratic agenda, which gave credibility to accusations 
that the true purpose of the trials and the arrests was to eliminate the secular opposition.53 
Because an overwhelming number of the accused individuals were well-known secular activists, 
the arrests of the officers and the Ergenekon trials were perceived as attacks against the 
guardians of secularism.54 
The Ergenekon case brought about controversies in public and between the government 
and opposition. In a setting in which polarization had already made its mark in politics, opinions 
on the coup allegations are expected to run parallel to the two cleavage lines identified earlier—
secularist versus pro-Islamist and Turkish versus Kurdish. Therefore, the following analysis tests 
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the hypothesis that the Ergenekon case contributed to polarization and matches the conflict 
especially between the AKP and the opposition parties. 
 
SURVEY DATA AND VARIABLES 
In order to test the hypotheses that opinion on the Ergenekon investigation was in accord with 
the polarization in society, this article uses the Survey on Armed Forces and Society in Turkey 
(SAFST) data, which are based on interviews conducted with close to 3,000 individuals in 
October 2011. The sample for the survey was determined by using the method of stratified 
multistage sampling design. In the first stage, primary sampling units (PSUs) were determined 
by the population sizes and the demographic characteristics (education level and density) of 
districts based on the Address-Based Population Registration System data of the Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). In the second stage, these PSUs were grouped into 12 strata, 
in accordance with the geographic classifications used also by TURKSTAT. Finally, 154 PSUs 
were randomly selected by a computer program, and 18 individuals were surveyed per sampling 
unit. Under the assumption of simple random sampling, the size of the sample would have a 2 
percent margin of error at a 95 percent confidence level. 
The SAFST posed questions measuring economic, political, sociological, ideological, 
ethnic, religious, and conjectural factors that could be utilized as independent variables—factors 
that might have caused differences of opinion toward Ergenekon. Table 4 lists the questions from 
the survey that were used to operationalize the independent variables. The dependent variable, 
attitudes toward the Ergenekon case, was measured by the SAFST question asking the 
respondents to agree, somewhat agree, or disagree with the statement, “I believe that the 
Ergenekon terrorist organization exists.” The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable are 
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displayed in Table 1. According to the SAFST, while close to half of the respondents (49 
percent) agreed that the Ergenekon terrorist organization existed, a significant number disagreed 
and asserted that they believed that such an organization did not exist. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
When the results are compared among respondents who voted for different parties in the 
2011 elections, it is clear that there was a difference of opinion in Turkish society with regard to 
Ergenekon (see Table 2). Around 65 percent of the respondents who said that they had voted for 
the AKP agreed with the statement that the “Ergenekon terrorist organization exists.” This result 
contradicts sharply those who said that they had voted for the main opposition, the CHP. 
Approximately the same proportion of CHP voters (67 percent) disagreed with the same 
statement, demonstrating the skepticism of the supporters of the opposition about the case. It is 
not discernible from descriptive statistics whether the MHP and BDP voters were more likely to 
think positively or negatively of the case. However, the sharp contrast between the AKP and 
CHP supporters implies that some of the controversies regarding Ergenekon affected and divided 
the general public’s opinion. In order to test the same conclusion by controlling for demographic 
and other political variables, a statistical model was devised by using the software Stata/SE. 
Ordinal logistic regression was utilized as a methodology, as an ordinal categorical scale was 
used to measure the dependent variable with the assumption that the categories could be ordered 
but the distances between them are not equal.55 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Table 3 provides an analysis of belief in the existence of the Ergenekon terrorist organization by 
using the ordinal logistic regression model. The ancillary parameters (1 and 2 in the model) 
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indicate that respondents who had a value of –0.66 or less on the underlying latent variable that 
gave rise to belief in Ergenekon would be classified as “disagree” when all other variables are 
evaluated at zero. Analogously, respondents who had a value between –0.66 and 0.24 on the 
latent variable would be classified as “somewhat agree,” and those who had a value of 0.24 or 
above would be classified as “agree” when all other variables have the value of zero. The t-test 
shows that these two cut points are statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
The results of the model reinforce the findings based on analyses of Turkish politics  and 
the descriptive statistics identified earlier. Indeed, the model in Table 3 suggests that there was 
polarization among the public on Ergenekon, running especially along the lines of secularist 
versus Islamist cleavage and splits in party politics. As with every analysis based on regression 
models, it is not possible to make a causal argument based on these results. In other words, the 
model does not tell us whether the Ergenekon case caused polarization among the supporters of 
different parties or ideologies. Similarly, because we do not have any comparable data collected 
over time, it is also not possible to comment on whether polarization in society had increased 
since the early 2000s as a result of the Ergenekon case. What the regression analysis tells us, 
however, is that divisions in public opinion regarding the coup allegations were parallel to sharp 
cleavages that existed in Turkish politics between 2002 and 2012. Thus, in some respects, the 
Ergenekon trials contributed to already existing centrifugal tendencies, or at least they did not 
help in annihilating political divisions. 
The model in Table 3 excludes the AKP voters as a category among the party vote 
dummy variables. Thus, estimated results must be interpreted in contrast to AKP voters. This 
allows a comparison between the voters of all other party supporters and the governing party and 
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makes it possible to observe whether opposition party voters perceived the investigation 
differently than the followers of the AKP. As expected, the model in Table 3 demonstrates that 
casting a ballot for the CHP in the 2011 elections decreased the likelihood of believing in the 
Ergenekon organization compared with the AKP voters, holding all other variables constant. The 
results for the MHP voters are also significant in the model, which is somewhat unexpected, as 
the descriptive table did not indicate that the majority of the nationalist party supporters had 
specific attitudes toward Ergenekon one way or another. However, regression analysis is useful 
for the purposes of examining how the outcome that we are interested in changes when one of 
the predictors varies when all other factors are held constant. Thus, the regression model gives a 
more accurate account of the perceptions of the MHP voters toward Ergenekon and indicates that 
the likelihood of MHP supporters having negative perceptions of the investigation was higher in 
comparison with the AKP voters. The model also shows that those who voted for political parties 
other than the four  represented in parliament were also suspicious of Ergenekon. 
Moreover, those who had a leftist ideology were less likely to have positive perceptions 
of the trials than those who had center or right-wing outlooks. Among those respondents who 
identified themselves as having left or center-left ideologies, the likelihood of believing in the 
existence of Ergenekon was lower (see Table 4 for the exact question that was asked in the 
survey). There are two reasons why being a leftist was chosen as a predictor variable in the 
model rather than adherents to other ideologies. First, a significant number of the survey 
respondents claimed that they did not identify with any of the ideologies on the left-versus-right 
spectrum (993 out of 2,773). This made it impractical to use the whole scale as a predictor 
variable. Second, it can be assumed that the AKP and the MHP represented right-wing voters, 
and therefore those who had center-right and right outlooks were captured by the model. 
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However, the same kind of match with left-wing voters and a political party did not exist. 
Arguably, the CHP represented the left of center in Turkish politics, but despite the fact that 
some leftists might have voted for the CHP, the fit between the ideology of the party and leftism 
is questionable.56 The party claimed to adhere to the main principles of social democracy in its 
program, but the ideology of the party still stressed the six principles adopted during the 1920s 
and 1930s, including nationalism and secularism.57 In the 1970s, under the leadership of Bülent 
Ecevit, the party claimed to represent the working classes and took on a leftist ideology. 
However, under the leadership of Deniz Baykal, who served as the chair of the party between 
1992 and 2010, the image of the party became increasingly elitist and status quo oriented. In the 
summer of 2008, for instance, there was speculation that the Socialist International would expel 
the CHP from membership, leading to public discussions about why the CHP did not represent 
the left or social democracy.58 Thus, with the assumption that some of those who had leftist 
ideologies were not reflected in the regression model by party votes, this ideological tendency 
was included as a predictor variable. 
When the results of the regression model are considered, it becomes clear that various 
groups in the opposition (whether they voted for parties other than the AKP or had leftist 
ideologies) were not convinced that the Ergenekon accusations were genuine and thought that 
the claims rested on fabricated evidence. This finding implies that the negative statements of the 
MHP and CHP leaders on Ergenekon found resonance among some segments of the public. 
Since the start of the investigation, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and other members of the party 
had criticized developments in Ergenekon and denounced the case from the angle of the damage 
it inflicted on the armed forces. The party is traditionally promilitary because of its nationalist 
ideology and values the status, honor, and reputation of the armed forces. The MHP condemned 
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the Ergenekon case mostly from this ideological position and regarded it as an unfortunate 
incident that jeopardized the prestige of the military.59 Although the comments of party 
leadership on the case were infrequent and made not in a manner that directly accused the 
governing party, nevertheless, it is clear that these statements were still important in shaping 
public opinion on the matter. 
Unlike the MHP leadership, since the beginning of the investigation and under the 
leadership of Deniz Baykal, the official line of the CHP had been consistently critical of the case 
and the government. The party questioned the existence of an organization named Ergenekon 
and accused the AKP of controlling the inquisition and the legal process in order to eliminate its 
rivals. Under its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, after 2010, the CHP continued to maintain the 
same position. Kılıçdaroğlu argued that the AKP was creating an “empire of terror,”60 repressing 
and censoring the press,61 and infringing on the rule of law and establishing a system based on 
the “law of the rulers.”62 The party leadership also agreed with critics who questioned the 
existence of the Ergenekon terrorist organization. In a statement belittling the whole process and 
signifying his skepticism, Kılıçdaroğlu bluntly stated that he wanted to become a member of the 
organization but did not know where to apply because he could not find its headquarters.63 
Because the AKP voters were the category that was excluded from the regression model 
as a predictor, one can conclude that people who voted for the ruling AKP in 2011 were more 
likely to have positive attitudes toward the investigation when compared with the voters of the 
opposition parties. This result goes hand in hand with the position the government took on the 
investigation and the manner in which it defended itself against criticisms involving the AKP’s 
conduct. The official policy of the AKP on Ergenekon emphasized that the investigation was not 
controlled by the government and that the judiciary and police forces were acting on their own. 
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Indeed, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized the opposition for attempting to 
interfere in the judicial process.64 The party maintained that it upheld the rule of law and 
therefore chose not to meddle with the process.65 Although in the later stages of the trials, 
Erdoğan made statements that empathized with the arrested officers and urged a swift court 
decision,66 since the beginning of the investigation, implicit in the discourse of the AKP was the 
belief that the suspects were guilty. This inherent conviction was perhaps not surprising, as the 
accused individuals were being charged with planning coups against the AKP government. 
Following the arrests of journalists under the Ergenekon investigation in 2011, for instance, the 
AKP leadership insisted that the reporters were held in prison because of their involvement in 
possible coup plots and terrorism.67 
Another salient finding of the regression model is that trust in the police increased the 
likelihood of belief in Ergenekon. This may be expected, as the police forces played an important 
role in exposing the coup plots, carrying out the investigation, and arresting the suspects. Those 
who trusted the police would also think that Ergenekon was real and that the security forces were 
only doing their jobs by uncovering a terrorist organization. The significance of trust in the 
police takes on a new meaning, however, once it is considered that according to some of the 
critiques, the police forces were controlled by the ruling party and that they were deliberately 
tarnishing the image of the military. Indeed, the issue of whether the police were trustworthy was 
at the center of the debate on Ergenekon. Thus, the results from the SAFST demonstrate that this 
dispute had its repercussions in public opinion as well, leading to a divergence of attitude toward 
the investigation among those who held different perspectives on the police. 
 As explained earlier, opinions regarding secularism were one of the main political 
cleavages in Turkey. Table 3 shows that polarization on Ergenekon ran parallel to this cleavage. 
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Even though religiosity does not dictate that an individual would also have antisecular opinions, 
nevertheless, it is important to note that religiosity changed opinions on the court case. 
Religiosity was measured in the model with the answers respondents gave to the question 
regarding the frequency with which they performed the prayer (see Table 4 for the exact question 
wording and coding). The model suggests that among religious individuals who performed the 
prayer regularly, belief in the existence of Ergenekon was higher. 
In order to measure the attitudes of secularist and relatively nonsecularist individuals, the 
position of respondents on primary and middle school children wearing headscarves in school 
was used as a predictor variable. In the Turkish political context, the issue of whether 
schoolchildren could wear the religious turban in school has been a contentious one, juxtaposing 
relatively secular individuals, who are opposed to the idea because children cannot decide to 
wear a headscarf independently of their parents, with those who claim that it is part of religious 
freedom. More than the issue of schoolchildren wearing the turban, the headscarf ban on 
university campuses has been a major source of controversy in Turkey. However, some in 
secular circles agree that the headscarf ban in universities should be lifted. Therefore, 
perspectives on this issue are not a good indicator of secularism. Indeed, some of those who still 
support the turban ban in higher education do so because of fears that if this ban is lifted, the next 
step would be to allow the turban in primary schools.68 Table 3 demonstrates that, as expected, 
secularism had significant influence over attitudes toward Ergenekon. Agreeing to the position 
that schoolchildren can wear the turban in school increased the likelihood of believing in the 
existence of the terrorist organization. Thus, the evaluation of the findings suggests that while 
secularist individuals tended to regard the accusations of coup plots as a sham, nonsecularist 
people had positive opinions toward the trials. These results imply that the divergence of opinion 
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on the Ergenekon investigation was closely associated with polarization between the secularists 
and pro-Islamists. 
 The same conclusion, however, does not hold with regard to ethnic cleavage. Turkish 
nationalism did not seem to relate to positive or negative opinions toward the case. It is not 
possible to deduce statistically significant changes in attitudes toward Ergenekon, either among 
those who identified themselves as ethnically Kurdish or among those who promoted Kurdish 
cultural rights such as positive stances toward education in Kurdish. Additionally, voting for the 
pro-Kurdish BDP did not necessarily have an influence on the point of view about the 
investigation. 
These results indicate that the ambiguous attitude of the BDP toward the case was also 
reflected among its voters. Given its pro-Kurdish policies, the BDP approached all security 
organizations and the judiciary with suspicion. As a result, the party’s stance on the case was 
mixed. On the one hand, it approved of the weakening of the political power of the armed forces; 
on the other hand, it argued that the AKP was using the investigation to eliminate its 
opposition.69 The party leaders suggested that the judiciary refrained from dealing with important 
issues, such as exposing the unsolved murders, torture, and abductions carried out by some 
officers in the Kurdish-dominated regions.70 In general, the BDP believed that the investigation 
did not go deep enough and did not touch on sensitive issues, such as revealing the political arm 
of the organization or coming to terms with violations of Kurdish rights.71 Despite the fact that 
ethnic politics in Turkey was closely related to issues involving the military and the role of the 
armed forces in politics and society, results from the SAFST data suggest that the Ergenekon 
investigation did not seem to be linked to the Turkish versus Kurdish cleavage. 
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Apart from political predictors, several control variables that were used in the model led 
to important results that are worth mentioning. Demographically, education and gender had an 
impact on attitudes toward Ergenekon, whereas age, place of residence, and income did not. 
More specifically, holding all other variables constant, women tended to be more skeptical of the 
case than men. Additionally, as the years of education that individuals had increased, belief in 
the existence of the terrorist organization was also expected to increase. 
Regression analysis demonstrates that there were divisions in society with regard to the 
coup allegations and the court case. AKP voters, men, those who trusted the police more, and 
more religious, relatively nonsecular, and educated citizens tended to believe that the terrorist 
organization was real. However, CHP and MHP voters, women, those who were skeptical of the 
police, and nonreligious, secular, leftist, and less educated people were more likely to disagree 
with the statement that the Ergenekon terrorist organization existed. In important respects, these 
findings indicate that the polarization among the governing and opposition parties, as well as 




What were the consequences of the Ergenekon investigation for Turkish democracy? This article 
has attempted to find an answer to this question. At first glance, it seems that the operation and 
trials were favorable developments that would cause further democratization. There is evidence 
suggesting that the Ergenekon investigation led to lower levels of trust in the Turkish military 
among the public. Such decrease in public confidence in the military could result in 
democratization because a military stripped of its popularity might find it more difficult to 
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intervene in politics and resist reforms that would curtail its political powers. Indeed, in practice, 
the coup investigations strengthened the AKP government vis-à-vis the military and led to 
second-wave reforms in civil-military relations in 2010, after the first wave that started in 1999. 
Despite this optimistic outlook, the analysis of the SAFST data shows that the Ergenekon 
trial contributed to polarization in Turkey or did not helpeliminate existing divisions. After the 
1990s, there was a growing divide among political party voters, between pro-Islamists and 
seculars, and between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists. Attitudes toward the Ergenekon 
investigation paralleled the former two cleavages. Given the different discourses of the party 
leaders on the trials, it is clear that the Ergenekon case matched the cleavage among AKP and 
CHP/MHP voters and between the pro-Islamists and seculars. 
This type of polarization is not conducive to democratic consolidation. If the model 
utilized by Linz and Stepan is applied to Turkish democracy, it becomes clear that the Ergenekon 
case led to behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional setbacks.72 First, essential facilitators of 
democracy, such as mutual trust among significant groups in society and belief that the other 
group is also loyal to the regime, are damaged because of polarization. These mutual suspicions 
may result in antidemocratic activities, such as using repression and looking for exit options. 
This leads to a situation in which democracy does not get consolidated behaviorally and 
significant actors turn to violence and try to overthrow the regime in order to achieve their 
objectives. Under current circumstances, the chances for the unconsolidated democracy of 
Turkey to break down because of another military coup are low. However, demonstrations that 
started against the government-supported project of building a shopping mall at Gezi Park in 
Istanbul’s Taksim Square showed how polarization could escalate into violence, with detrimental 
consequences for democracy. In the summer of 2013, thousands of people in a number of cities 
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across Turkey protested against the government for several months. The police attempted to 
disperse the crowds by using teargas, water cannons, and clubs. While the opposition and the 
protestors claimed that the police used disproportionate force against peaceful protestors, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan argued that the events were a conspiracy against the government carried out by 
several groups, including the CHP and financial interests.73 In less than one month following the 
start of the Gezi events, four people had died, 11 protestors had lost their eyes, and 7,832 had 
been injured.74 Increasing polarization in Turkish politics, to which Ergenekon also contributed, 
spiraled out of control and brought violence to the streets. As the government used repression, 
behavioral compliance with democracy deteriorated. 
Yet, the consequences of Ergenekon were more nuanced than just the possibility of 
decreasing behavioral compliance with democracy. Attitudinally, polarization makes it more 
difficult for elites and public to come together and agree on the basic rules of the game. 
Continued polarization, further perpetuated by the controversies of the court trials, led to a 
questioning of the rules of the game, especially among the supporters of the opposition parties 
and secularists. Although they might not hedge and support an antidemocratic regime 
behaviorally, they might still abandon democratic norms altogether in the future. Besides, 
currently, some secular circles call into dispute the existence of the rule of law, the results of the 
elections, and the legitimacy of the AKP to rule. The governing party, on the other hand, 
perceives these challenges as antidemocratic attacks and adopts a rhetoric against them, which 
further increases suspicions that the AKP is repressing the voices of the opposition parties and 
media. As a result, the number of people who question the basic rules of the game, such as 
elections and freedom of speech, increases. 
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Finally, constitutionally, Turkey still does not have a consolidated democracy. This 
dimension refers to actors being accustomed to competing within the specific laws and 
procedures of the regime. The disputes regarding the constitution of Turkey are a good example 
of how polarization in politics has led to the failure of consolidation in this dimension. Far from 
abiding by the laws of the country, the government and opposition both advocate the writing of a 
new constitution, replacing the one that was written during military rule in 1982. The idea of a 
new constitution, indeed, is a positive development given the antidemocratic elements of the old 
one. However, the AKP and the opposition parties cannot agree on most of the articles of the 
constitution. In the parliamentary committee responsible for writing the new constitution, the 
parties agreed only on 29 articles out of the 150 they discussed in more than one and a half 
years.75 The AKP declared that if the committee could not reach a compromise, then the 
government would write its own constitution and seek public approval in a referendum. The new 
AKP constitution is expected to change the system of government from a parliamentary to a 
presidential one. The opposition forces strictly oppose this system change, arguing that it would 
lead to an authoritarian regime under the rule of the AKP leadership.76 This ongoing debate 
clearly shows how polarization contributes to the failure of democratic consolidation in Turkey 
constitutionally. 
Currently in Turkey, significant actors do not provide attitudinal support for the rules of 
the regime, and they cannot agree on the constitution and the basic laws and procedures of the 
country. Turkey witnessed violence and diminishing behavioral endorsement for the regime, too. 
Although Ergenekon is not the only factor that contributed to polarization, it is one of the 
elements that dealt a blow to Turkish democracy. It is true that the annihilation of military coups, 
the civilianization of the regime, and declining public confidence in the armed forces are 
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welcomed consequences of the court case. However, these positive impressions associated with 
Ergenekon disappear once the negative consequences of the case are analyzed. By cutting deep 
into the ruptures of Turkish politics while seeming to heal other past injuries, the case had been a 
double-edged sword for Turkish democracy.* 
[Insert Table 4 near end of article] 
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Disagree 871 33.59 
Somewhat agree  461 17.78 
Agree  1,261 48.63 
TOTAL 2,593 100.00 










Descriptive Statistics: Party Vote and Attitudes toward Ergenekon 
 
  Belief in the Existence of Ergenekon 








       
AKP 222 202 801 1,225 
(percent)  (18.12)  (16.49)  (65.39)  (100.00)  
         
CHP 355 79 95 529 
 (percent) (67.11)  (14.93)  (17.96)  (100.00)  
         
MHP 79 37 86 202 
 (percent) (39.11)  (18.32)  (42.57)  (100.00)  
         
BDP 22 25 54 101 
 (percent) (21.78)  (24.75)  (53.47)  (100.00)  




20 10 37 67 
(29.85)  (14.93)  (55.22)  (100.00)  
       
Total 698 353 1,073 2,124 
(percent)  (32.86)  (16.62)  (50.52)  (100.00) 
           Source: Author’s own calculations based on SAFST data. 
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TABLE 3: Ordinal Logistic Regression Model of Belief in the Existence of the Ergenekon 
Organization 
 
Predictors Coefficient (standard errors) 
  
Demographic variables:  
           Age –0.0044885 
 (0.0040335) 
           Education 0.0336967** 
 (0.014993) 
           Place of residence 0.0313683 
 (0.0617427) 
           Gender –0.3734342*** 
 (0.1003311) 
           Income 0.0000364   
 (0.0000443) 
Party vote in the 2011 national elections:  
  
           Republican People’s Party (CHP) –1.601729*** 
 (0.157529) 
           Nationalist Action Party (MHP) –0.7969605*** 
 (0.1570459) 
           Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) –0.1773047 
 (0.2979115) 
           Other party voters -0.519841* 
 (0.2714714) 
Leftist –0.4398283*** 
 (0.1630306)    
Trust in the police 0.3161062*** 
 (0.067903) 
Ethnicity and nationalism:  
  
           Turkish nationalism –0.0895901 
 (0.0860979) 
           Kurdish ethnicity 0.0727053 
 (0.2008894) 
           Position on Kurdish language rights –0.0000763 
 (0.0601488) 
Secularism and religiosity:  
  
          Religiosity 0.3628578*** 
 (0.1095689) 
          Position on primary and middle school  








LR χ2 (16) 573.00 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1435 
     Source: Author’s own calculations based on SAFST data.  Note: The excluded categories are the AKP voters and 
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those who reside in rural areas.  
     *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. 
TABLE 4 
 




Survey Question Numbers, 
Questions, and Coding 
Codes Used in the Model 
Gender 
Q1. The gender of the respondent 
 
Female: 1 
Male and no answer: 0 
Age Q2. How old are you? 
Continuous from 17 to 86 
(Even though the respondents 
should have been 18 years old 
or older, in the final survey 
data, there were two 
respondents who were age 17) 
Education 
Q3. What is your educational status, 
in other words, what is the level of 
school you last finished? 
 
Illiterate: 0 
Literate with no diploma: 1 
Primary school graduate: 5 
Middle school graduate: 8 
High school graduate: 11 
University graduate: 15 
Graduate school: 17 
Party vote in the 
2011 national 
elections 
Q12. Who, which party did you vote 
for in the 12 June general deputyship 
elections? 
Dummy variables were 
created for the AKP, CHP, 
MHP, BDP, and other party 
voters 
Leftist 
Q14. In terms of politics, there has 
been a right, left, center tradition in 
Turkey for many years. Where 
would you identify yourself in terms 
of political outlook? 
Left; Center left; Center; Center 
right; Right; None 
Left or center left: 1 
Others: 0 
Turkish nationalism 
Q15. What is the extent to which 
you would describe yourself as a 
Turkish nationalist? 
Very; A little; None 
Very: 2 
A little: 1 
None: 0 
The respondents were given the following instruction for questions 16–42: “Now I am going 
to read you a series of sentences. Can you indicate your opinions on these questions as “I 
agree,” “I somewhat agree,” and “I disagree”? 
Position on primary 
and middle school 
children wearing 
headscarves 
Q18. Female students attending 
primary and middle school can 
cover their heads during class.  
Agree: 2 




Position on Kurdish 
language rights 
Q20. The education rights of the 
Kurds in their own language should 
be accepted. 
Agree: 2 
Somewhat agree: 1 
Disagree: 0 
Belief in the 
existence of 
Ergenekon 
Q23. I believe that the Ergenekon 
terrorist organization exists. 
Agree: 2 
Somewhat agree: 1 
Disagree: 0 
Trust in the police 
Q27. I trust police officers. 
 
Agree: 2 
Somewhat agree: 1 
Disagree: 0 
Kurdish ethnicity 
Q48. All of us are Turkish citizens, 
but we can be from different ethnic 
roots. How would you feel or 






Q50. This is very important for our 
survey, what is the monthly total 
income of the people who live at 
your home? Including everybody’s 
every type of earning, how many 
liras enter your home on average 
each month? 
in 1000 TL 
(There were 13 respondents 
who declared that their 
household income was zero 
Turkish liras and one 
respondent who declared four 
liras. The rest of the 
respondents stated various 
numbers ranging from 100 to 
15,000 liras.) 
Religiosity 
Q52. Do you perform prayer 
regularly, in other words every day, 
five times a day? 
Yes; No 
Yes: 1 
No: 0  
Place of residence 
Where the interview was conducted  
Village; Town; Metropolis 
Metropolitan region: 2 
Town: 1 
Village: 0 
 
 
